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FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
DOMESTIC SUBVERSIVES
Three defendants' sought disclosure of records of conversations
seized through warrantless wiretaps2 to determine whether the evidence
being used against them was tainted thereby. Through an affidavit by
the Attorney General,3 the Government admitted that agents had over-
heard certain of defendant Plamondon's conversations while monitoring
wiretaps installed to gather intelligence on domestic subversives. The
Government contended that the surveillances were legal because the At-
torney General had authorized them pursuant to the President's power
to protect the national security. The federal district court found the
seizures to be violative of Plamondon's fourth amendment rights and
ordered full disclosure to him of the records of his overheard conversa-
tions.' The Government petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit for a writ of mandamus to set aside the district court order. The
petition was denied on the grounds that the surveillances were unconsti-
tutional and that disclosure had been properly ordered.' On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed: The fourth amend-
ment mandates prior judicial approval of electronic surveillances con-
ducted to safeguard the national security from subversion by domestic
organizations. United States v. United States District Court, 92 S. Ct.
2125 (1972).
The Court's decisions in Berger v. New York6 and Katz v. United
States7 firmly established the principle that the fourth amendment 8 pro-
tects a person's private conversations, not just his private premises.
1. They were charged with conspiracy to destroy government property. Defendant
Plamondon was also charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of the CIA.
2. Although the noted case involves wiretapping, the terms "wiretapping" and "elec-
ronic surveillance" will herein be used interchangeably in keeping with the Court's exclusive
use of the broader term to include the narrower. The Court similarly failed to distinguish
between wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, or "bugging," in the following cases:
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (bugging); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (bugging); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (bugging). Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970), also
makes no such distinction. Apparently, the standards for national security wiretapping set
forth in the noted decision apply equally to electronic eavesdropping (bugging).
3. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2128 n.2 (1972) (quoting
Attorney General's affidavit).
4. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Warrantless domestic
national security wiretaps were also held unconstitutional in United States v. Smith, 321
F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
5. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).
6. 388 U.S. 41 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Berger).
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
CASES NOTED
Katz,9 Alderman v. United States,'° Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act," and years of extrajudicial electronic surveil-
lances of domestic organizations' 2 set the stage for the instant case.
In Alderman, the Court held that records of illegally overheard con-
versations must be disclosed-without previous determination of rele-
vancy by the trial judge-to any defendant who has standing to object,
in order to determine whether evidence against him grew out of the un-
lawful surveillance.18
With Title III, Congress sought to promote crime control in a man-
ner consistent with the constitutional requirements for electronic sur-
veillance pronounced in Berger and Katz. Electronic surveillance is per-
mitted where evidence of specified crimes" is sought, and a warrant has
been previously obtained through a meticulously specified procedure
which requires detailed justification of the proposed surveillance.' Other-
wise, wiretapping and bugging constitute violations of Title III."
The Government sought an exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement where electronic surveillance is " 'deemed necessary
to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack
and subvert the existing structure of Government.'"7 Mr. Justice Powell,
speaking for the Court, noted the absence, from the facts presented, of
9. Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, stated: "Whether safeguards other
than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situa-
tion involving the national security is not a question presented by this case." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 388 n.23 (1967). However, Mr. Justice White suggested that the
warrant procedure could be dispensed with where the Attorney General has "considered the
requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable." Id.
at 364 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, sharply
criticized the suggestion, calling it a "wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive
Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Execu-
tive Branch itself labels 'national security' matters." Id. at 359 (concurring opinion). In his
concurring opinion in Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), written after his
opinion in Katz, Mr. Justice Stewart indicated that the above footnote in Katz referred
only to national security wiretaps "relating to the gathering of foreign intelligence informa-
tion." Id. at 314 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
10. 394 U.S. 165 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Alderman].
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title III).
12. For a history of governmental wiretapping and its rationale, see Theoharis & Meyer,
The "National Security Justification" for Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception,
14 WAYNE L. REv. 749, 753-68 (1968).
13. In the instant case the Attorney General's affidavit stated: "I certify that it would
prejudice the national interest to disclose the particular facts concerning these surveillances
other than to the court in camera." 92 S. Ct. at 2128 n.2 (quoting Attorney General's
affidavit). The Government's dilemma was recognized in Alderman:
It may be that the prospect of disclosure will compel the Government to dismiss
some prosecutions in deference to national security or third-party interests. But
this is a choice the Government concededly faces with respect to material which it
has obtained illegally . ...
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970).
15. Id. at § 2518.
16. Id. at § 2511(1).
17. 92 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Attorney General's affidavit) (emphasis by the Court).
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evidence of any involvement of a foreign power, and carefully emphasized
the narrowness of the issue--the scope of the President's surveillance
power with respect to "domestic organizations" only.' 8
The Government's principal argument rested on the following pro-
vision of Title III:
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the
overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means,
or against any other clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government."
The Government suggested that " 'in excepting national security
surveillances from the Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized
the President's authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judi-
cial approval.' 02 The Court found that the legislative history of Title
III contradicted the Government's interpretation of the quoted section.21
Mr. Justice Powell found in the language and structure of the Act addi-
tional support for interpreting the section as a congressional disclaimer
and expression of neutrality. He stated that, given the extraordinary care
evident in the drafting of other sections, "it would have been incongru-
ous for Congress to have legislated with respect to the important and
complex area of national security in a single brief and nebulous para-
graph. 2
Once the statutory argument was disposed of, the Court proceeded
to examine the constitutional powers of the President in light of "the
essential Fourth Amendment inquiry into the 'reasonableness' of the
search and seizure in question, and the way in which that 'reasonable-
ness' derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant
clause." 28
The Court recognized the President's duty to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States" 24-to preserve the public
order-and further recognized that electronic surveillance could be a
useful device in performing that duty. But the potentially Orwellian
characteristics of electronic surveillance at the chief executive's discre-
tion outweighed, in the Court's opinion, the Government's practical argu-
18. Id. at 2132-33 & n.8.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (emphasis added).
20. 92 S. Ct. at 2129 (quoting Government Brief).
21. Id. at 2131-32 & n.7. The Court stressed Senator Hart's remark:
In addition, Mr. President, as I think our exchange makes clear, nothing in Section
2511(3) even attempts to define the limits of the President's national security power
under present law, which I have always found extremely vague .... Section 2511(3)
merely says that if the President has such a power, then its exercise is in no way
affected by title III.
Id. at 2132, quoting 114 CoNG. R c. 14751 (1968) (emphasis by the Court).
22. 92 S. Ct. at 2131. See also id. n.8.
23. Id. at 2133 (citation omitted).
24. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
CASES NOTED
ments,25 though Mr. Justice Powell stated that there was "pragmatic
force to the Government's position. ' 26
The Government's first pragmatic argument was that prior judicial
review would "obstruct" the intelligence gathering process; furthermore,
traditional warrant requirements were inappropriate because the primary
objective of these surveillances was ongoing intelligence gathering, not
specific criminal prosecutions.27 However, the Court stated:
Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the
inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the neces-
sarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering,
and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee po-
litical dissent.2 8
Secondly, the Government argued that
courts "as a practical matter would have neither the knowledge
nor the techniques necessary to determine whether there was
probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to
protect national security." These security problems, the Gov-
ernment contend[ed], involve "a large number of complex and
subtle factors" beyond the competence of courts to evaluate.2 9
The Court responded that "[i]f the threat is too subtle or complex...
to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is
probable cause for surveillance."8 0
Finally, the Government suggested that disclosure to a magistrate
of information involved in domestic security surveillances
"would create serious potential dangers to the national security
and to the lives of informants and agents . . . [It would]
25. The Government unsuccessfully argued before the court of appeals that the
President could authorize warrantless electronic surveillances because of "'the historical
power of the sovereign to preserve itself.'" United States v. United States Dist. Court,
444 F.2d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1971) (quoting Government Memorandum) (emphasis by the
court). The language "'the inherent power of the President to safeguard the security of
the nation'" was also used. Id. (quoting Government Supplemental Memorandum). No
constitutional language was cited in support of this asserted power, and no limitations on
it were suggested. The court found the cited case law inapplicable-six of the cases dealt
with the war powers or foreign relations powers of the presidency-and pointed out that
the inherent power doctrine had been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 658-61 (1971). No such sweeping assertion of power can be
found in the instant case.
26. 92 S. Ct. at 2138.
27. For an analysis of the criminal/non-criminal dichotomy, see Note, The "National
Security Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or Judicial Responsibility, 45 S. CAL,. L. REv.
888, 890-95 (1972).
28. 92 S. Ct. at 2138. The Government's suggested test called for routine post-
surveillance judicial approval of domestic security wiretaps except where "'the Attorney
General's determination that the proposed surveillance relates to a national security matter
is arbitrary and capricious . . . .'" Id. at 2137 n.19 (quoting Government Brief). For an
account of past and present investigative sins, see id. at 2140-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 2138 (quoting Government Reply Brief) (emphasis added).
30. Id.
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create a greater 'danger of leaks . . . , because in addition to
the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer and some other
official like a law assistant or bailiff who may be apprised of
the nature' of the surveillance." 81
The Court was not persuaded and adhered to its consistent view,
as stated in Katz, "that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment .... 82
In concluding, Mr. Justice Powell emphasized the flexibility of the
fourth amendment's standard of probable cause; "the warrant applica-
tion may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and
the nature of citizen rights deserving protection."8 He suggested that
Congress could provide reasonable standards and procedures for domestic
security warrants somewhat different from those set forth in Title III.
Having found the seizure of Plamondon's conversations unconstitutional,
the Court affirmed the order of disclosure.
Mr. Justice White, concurring in the result, suggested that the Court
could have avoided the constitutional issue by finding the wiretaps illegal
under Title III."4 Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, emphasized what was
at stake:
Here federal agents wish to rummage for months on end through
every conversation, no matter how intimate or personal, carried
over selected telephone lines simply to seize those few utter-
ances which may add to their sense of the pulse of a domestic
underground.
We are told that one national security wiretap lasted for
14 months and monitored over 900 conversations.8 5
Two days after this decision, the Attorney General disclosed that
the Government maintained "less than thirty" internal security wiretaps,
of which "less than ten" involved domestic groups with no significant
relationship to foreign powers; subsequently, six wiretaps were discon-
tinued.8
31. Id. (quoting Government Reply Brief).
If, as the Government asserts, following that method poses security problems
(because an indiscrete or corruptible judge or court employee might betray the pro-
posed investigation), then surely the answer is to take steps to refine the method
and eliminate the problems. No one could be in better position to help the courts
accomplish this goal than the Attorney General.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 666 (6th Cir. 1971).
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). The few
recognized exceptions are designed to protect law enforcement officers and preserve evidence
from destruction. Id. at 357-58 & nn.19-22.
33. 92 S. Ct. at 2139.
34. Id. at 2146 (concurring opinion).
35. Id. at 2141 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). For a comparison of the
respective average durations of court-ordered and executive-ordered electronic surveil-
lances, see id. at 2145 (Appendix to concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).
36. Powers, The Government is Watching, Tan ATLANTIC, Oct. 1972, at 57, where the
author wonders whether the Attorney General may have been less than candid.
CASES NOTED
The Court avoided the issue of the scope of the Executive's surveil-
lance power over foreign elements, leaving an ominous loophole-the
vague "significant connection" standard"7-which the Executive took
advantage of without hesitation. The Justice Department's failure to dis-
continue all but six of the acknowledged wiretaps was an exercise of the
kind of executive discretion the Court seemingly intended to curtail. The
citizen is hardly reassured "that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging
of law-abiding citizens cannot occur."38
JUAN P. LOUMIET
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS VS. PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS-THE DEATH OF THE
"FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT"
When respondents began to distribute anti-Vietnam War handbills
within the mall of petitioner's shopping center, uniformed security guards
threatened to arrest them for trespassing. The respondents left peace-
fully, but then sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to
establish their right to exercise the freedoms of speech and press and to
enjoin further interference from the petitioner. They argued that the
shopping center was the "functional equivalent" of public property, and,
therefore, the first and fourteenth amendments guaranteed their rights.1
The petitioner, Lloyd Corporation, contended that since the shopping
center was private property, it could enforce its strict and nondiscrimina-
tory no-handbilling rule under the protection of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 2 The federal district court of Oregon held for the respond-
ents and enjoined interference by the petitioner.' This decision was
37. Although we attempt no precise definition, we use the term "domestic organiza-
tion" in this opinion to mean a group or organization (whether formally or
informally constituted) composed of citizens of the United States and which has
no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies. No doubt
there are cases where it will be difficult to distinguish between "domestic" and
"foreign" unlawful activities directed against the Government of the United States
where there is collaboration in varying degrees between domestic groups or
organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But this is not such a case.
92 S. Ct. at 2133 n.8 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 2132. For an argument that electronic surveillance Ls per se unconstitutional
see Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,
118 U. Pa. L. REv. 169 (1969).
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." U.S. OONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States . . .without due process of law ...."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
3. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
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